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Abstract Presentists believe that only present things exist. But opponents insist
this view has unacceptable implications: if only present things exist, we can’t
express singular propositions about the past, since the obvious propositional con-
stituents don’t exist, nor can we account for temporal passage, or the openness of the
future. According to such opponents, and in spite of the apparent ‘common sense’
status of the view, presentism should be rejected on the basis of these unaccept-
able implications. In this paper, I present and defend a version of presentism
(‘Thisness Presentism’) that avoids the unacceptable implications. The basic strat-
egy I employ is familiar—I postulate presently existing entities to serve as surro-
gates (or ‘proxies’) for non-present entities—but some of the details of my proposal
are more novel, and their application to these problems is certainly novel. One
overarching thesis of this paper is that Thisness Presentism is preferable to other
versions of presentism since it solves important problems facing standard iterations
of the view. And I assume that this is a good positive reason in favour of the
underlying thisness ontology.
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Presentism is the view that, necessarily, it’s always the case that only present
entities exist.1 In slogan form: ‘‘only present things exist.’’ Typically, presentism is
described as the intuitive or ‘common sense’ view of time (Markosian 2004: 48).2
And even some opponents, who ultimately reject presentism, accept that the
‘guiding intuition is compelling’ (Sider 2001: 11). But many insist that presentism
has unacceptable implications: if only present things exist, we can’t express singular
propositions about the past, since the obvious propositional constituents don’t exist
(cf. Fitch 1994), nor can we account for temporal passage (i.e. that what’s present
changes) (cf. Leininger 2015), or the so-called ‘asymmetry of fixity’ (i.e. the open
future and closed past) (cf. Diekemper 2005). According to such opponents, and in
spite of the apparent ‘common sense’ status of the view, presentism should be
rejected on the basis of these unacceptable implications.
In this paper, I present and defend a version of presentism that avoids the
unacceptable implications. The basic strategy I employ is familiar—I postulate
presently existing entities to serve as surrogates (or ‘proxies’) for non-present
entities—but some of the details of my proposal are more novel, and their
application to these problems is certainly novel. The plan for the paper is simple. To
begin, I sketch my preferred version of presentism, ‘Thisness Presentism’ (Sect. 1).
Then, I present the three problems facing presentism, mentioned above, and
describe how Thisness Presentism solves each problem in turn (Sects. 2, 3). In
doing so, I also develop the view in more detail and respond to some objections to
Thisness Presentism, anticipated by Ned Markosian (2004).
One overarching thesis of this paper is that Thisness Presentism is preferable to
other versions of presentism since it solves important problems facing standard
iterations of the view. And I assume that this is a good positive reason in favour of
the underlying thisness ontology.3 Paraphrasing David Lewis, I say: ‘‘Why believe
in a plurality of thisnesses?—Because the hypothesis is serviceable, and that’s a
reason to think it’s true’’ (cf. Lewis 1986: 3). In this paper, I argue that Thisness
Presentism is serviceable insofar as it solves several problems for presentism; I
think that this constitutes very good indirect support for the view.
1 This is adapted from Markosian’s (2004: 47, fn. 1) characterisation of presentism. For more detail on
how to define presentism, see Crisp (2004), Sider (2006), and Tallant (2014), inter alia. Presentism, so
understood, is primarily a claim about what there is. There’s more to presentism, as a theory of time, than
the ontological claim articulated (‘‘only present things exist’’), but this characterisation suffices as part of
the preliminaries.
2 See also, e.g., Putnam (1967: 240), Bigelow (1996: 35–36), McKinnon (2003: 305–307), and
Zimmerman (2008: 221–223), inter alia. One notable dissenter is David Lewis, who states: ‘In saying that
there are no other times… it goes against what we all believe. No man, unless it be at the moment of his
execution, believes that he has no future; still less does anyone believe that he has no past’ (Lewis 1986:
204). But, as Trenton Merricks correctly notes, this challenge has purchase only against the view that
‘everything is instantaneous’ and that’s not presentism (Merricks 2007: 124, fn. 6). Lewis’s reaction
doesn’t undermine the apparent intuitiveness of presentism when presentism is properly formulated.
Typically, presentists insist that we can express true propositions about the non-present, i.e. it’s true that
certain entities have existed.
3 See e.g. Adams (1979), Rosenkrantz (1993: 72–139) and Lycan (1994: 95–99) for some independent
arguments in favour of the existence of thisnesses. In this paper, I concentrate on the claim that a thisness
ontology is beneficial for presentists.
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1 A sketch of Thisness Presentism
1.1 Preliminaries
According to Thisness Presentism, there are presently existing ‘thisnesses’ (or
‘haecceities’) of past and present entities. A ‘thisness’ is the property of being a
particular entity (or, if you prefer, being identical with an entity). For a given x, x’s
thisness is the property being (identical with) x, e.g. Stephen Colbert’s thisness is
the property being Colbert, and so on (Adams 1979: 6).
It’s worth noting, as part of these preliminary remarks, that Simon Keller (2004:
96–99) briefly discusses this kind of view, which he calls ‘Haecceitist Presentism’,
as a solution to the ‘truth-maker objection’ to presentism (cf. Sider 2001: 35–42).
Keller’s Haecceitist Presentism is an important precursor to Thisness Presentism,
but Keller’s view is both underdeveloped and under-defended. My aim is to develop
Thisness Presentism and show how this view solves other problems facing
presentism. It’s also worth noting that my account of the nature of thisnesses is
inspired by Robert Adams’s (1979, 1981, 1986) ontology of thisness. One
contribution of this paper is to develop and defend a view that usefully builds on
Adams’s picture in a way acceptable to presentists. Recently, there’s been renewed
interest in an ontology of thisness (cf. Diekemper 2009, 2014, 2015). But no one has
yet acknowledged the considerable work that such an ontology can do in defence of
presentism.
1.2 An ontology of thisness
Thisnesses are properties of a sui generis kind; a thisness is a particular, primitive,
purely non-qualitative property of an entity. Hence, the following is true of (e.g.)
Colbert’s thisness, the property being Colbert: it can only be instantiated by Colbert;
it’s a simple, unstructured property, which isn’t reducible to any purely qualitative
properties of Colbert (or relations to other entities); the property involves Colbert (in
a sense), although it’s not constituted by him (qua primitive property); and,
Colbert’s thisness is something like an ‘individual essence’ of Colbert (i.e. it’s an
essential property of Colbert that only Colbert could ever exemplify)4 and it shares
some typical hallmarks of other (essential) properties.
Thisnesses can exist uninstantiated. Consider an individual, Anna, who begins
her life at time t and who exists until t100, when she ceases to exist. Anna’s thisness,
the property being Anna, comes into being with Anna at t and is uniquely
instantiated by her until t100. But, when Anna ceases to exist, her thisness continues
to exist uninstantiated. So, on this view, there are thisnesses of past and present
entities, but no thisnesses of future entities (cf. Adams 1986). This view is prima
4 The definition of ‘individual essence’ I have in mind is due to Robert Adams (1981) and Alvin
Plantinga (1974), inter alia. Let’s suppose that P is an essential property of x if and only if, necessarily, if
x exists, then x exemplifies P; P is an individual essence of x if and only if P is (i) an essential property of
x and, (ii) necessarily, for all individuals y, y exemplifies P if and only if y is numerically identical to x
(cf. Menzel 2015: §4.1.2).
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facie acceptable to presentists, who accept ‘‘only present things exist,’’ since it’s
part of the nature of a thisness that Anna doesn’t need to continue existing in order
for her thisness to continue existing. (And it’s the presently existing thisnesses of
past entities that function as the (present) surrogates for past entities.) The idea that
thisnesses can exist uninstantiated isn’t particularly novel (cf. Adams 1986; Keller
2004), but no one has yet offered an account of the relationship between an entity
and its thisness that’s acceptable to presentists. I develop such an account towards
the end of this section (in Sect. 1.4).
One upshot of Thisness Presentism is that there are thisnesses of past entities but
no thisnesses of future entities. Why think that this is so? What sort of argument can
be given in support of this restriction? Robert Adams (1986) provides one such
argument, which I rehearse and endorse in what remains of Sect. 1. The line of
reasoning is a development of his (1981) argument that there are no thisnesses of
non-actual entities. Next, in Sect. 1.3, I briefly outline Adams’s argument against
thisnesses of non-actual entities and then move on to the argument against
thisnesses of future entities.
1.3 Two arguments
Actualism is the view that, necessarily, it’s always the case that only actual entities
exist.5 (Slogan: ‘‘only actual things exist.’’) Adams (1981) argues that actualism is
inconsistent with the existence of thisnesses of non-actual entities and, since
actualism is true, so we should reject the existence of such thisnesses. But why think
actualism is inconsistent with the existence of thisnesses of non-actual entities? The
basic idea is simple: a property, such as being (identical with) x, cannot exist if x has
never existed (and if x isn’t actual, then x has never existed). Adams (1981) makes
the point similarly, as follows:
To be the property of being identical with a particular individual is to stand,
primitively, in a unique relation with that individual. This relation between an
individual and its thisness is the crux of the argument. It would be absurd to
suppose that being the property of being identical with me could be a purely
internal feature of my thisness, not implying any relation to me. The relation
between an individual and its thisness is essential to both of them. My thisness
is a property that I would have in every possible world in which I would exist
– but equally, my thisness could not exist without being mine. It could not
exist without being the thisness of Robert Merrihew Adams. So if there were a
thisness of a non-actual individual, it would stand, primitively, in a relation to
that individual. But according to actualism non-actual individuals cannot enter
primitively into any relation. It seems to follow that according to actualism
there cannot be a thisness of a non-actual individual. (1981: 11)
5 See e.g. Adams (1974, 1981), Plantinga (1974, 1976), and van Inwagen (1986), inter alia. For a survey,
see Menzel (2015). I assume actualism, which strikes me as a plausible thesis in the metaphysics of
modality, but I don’t argue for it.
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According to Adams, the existence of (e.g.) x’s thisness, T, implies a relation with x
that couldn’t obtain if x is non-actual. Paraphrasing Adams, ‘‘T couldn’t exist
without being x’s thisness’’ and ‘‘T couldn’t exist without the actual existence of x.’’
On one interpretation, it’s metaphysically impossible for x’s thisness to exist
without x. But this is too strong, as I make clear in what follows. On a more sensible
interpretation, it’s (metaphysically) impossible for x’s thisness to exist without the
initial existence of x.
To defend the claim that x’s thisness cannot exist without the initial existence of
x (and, in doing so, support the view that x’s thisness comes into being with x), let’s
turn to Adams’s (1986) argument against the thisnesses of future entities. Consider
the following statement of the argument, from Adams:
I was born in 1937. Among the many metaphysically possible continuations of
the actual history of the world up until, say, 1935, there are surely some in
which I would never have existed. It is plausible to conclude that I could have
failed to exist even given everything that existed in 1935, or that had existed
before then, or that exists timelessly—and, conversely, that all of those things
could have existed even if I had never existed. But, as I have argued, neither
my thisness nor any singular propositions about me exists in any metaphys-
ically possible world in which I never exist; they are not among the things that
could have existed even if I had never existed. It follows that they are not
among the things that existed in 1935, or before, or that exist timelessly. My
thisness, and singular propositions about me, cannot have pre-existed me
because if they had, it would have been possible for them to have existed even
if I had never existed, and that is not possible. (1986: 316–7)
Let’s suppose that x is a contingent existent. Prior to the existence of x, it’s
metaphysically possible that x fails to exist. So, we can suppose there’s some world
w, according to which it’s possible (at time t0) that x will exist at t1 and it’s also
possible (at t0) that x will not exist at t1. According to Adams, the existence of x’s
thisness T implies a relation with x that couldn’t obtain if x is non-actual (so, T
couldn’t exist without the actual existence of x). But, at world w at time t0, it’s
indeterminate whether x will actually exist. Hence, T cannot exist at w prior to the
existence of x at t1. (And, given the nature of thisnesses, x cannot exist and fail to
exemplify T.) So, x’s thisness T comes into being with x.
I find Adams’s argument persuasive. Even so, it employs a principle about the
contingent existence of future entities that some may find controversial. The
principle is as follows:
For any two entities, x and y, and for any time t, if x existed before t (or if x
exists timelessly), and y exists contingently and comes into existence at t, then
it would be metaphysically possible for x to have existed even if y had never
existed (Adams 1986: 317).
This principle strikes me as immediately plausible. It’s natural to think there are a
number of ‘ways the world might be’ and a number of ways the future of the world
might unfold. Further, a rejection of this principle amounts to a rejection of the pre-
theoretic notion that the future is ‘open’ (in a sense). That is, if the existence of
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future entities isn’t contingent, then what will be is ‘closed’ or ‘fixed’. Indeed,
Adams notes that his position ‘rests on the intuition that the future … is
metaphysically open in a way that the present and the past are not’ (1986: 318).
This sort of argument should be particularly attractive to presentists, since
presentists typically endorse the thesis that the future is open. In fact, some view
securing the ‘openness’ of the future as a central motivation for adopting presentism
(cf. Diekemper 2005: 223; Cameron 2011: 77). Hence, rejecting the principle upon
which the argument (against thisnesses of future entities) rests, and thus rejecting
the contingent existence of future entities, conflicts with at least one advertised
motivation for presentism.
According to Thisness Presentism, x’s thisness T comes into being with x, T is
uniquely instantiated by x throughout x’s existence, and T continues to exist
(uninstantiated) once x has ceased to exist. So far, I’ve used arguments from Adams
(1981, 1986) to support the idea that T comes into being with x, but I’ve not said
enough to motivate the idea that T continues to exist (uninstantiated). In fact, one
might worry that Adams’s line of argument against the existence of thisnesses of
future entities might be used against thisnesses of past entities as well.6 In what
remains of Sect. 1, I offer some further defence of the idea that a thisness continues
to exist (uninstantiated) once its bearer has ceased to exist. In particular, I develop
an account of the relationship between an entity and its thisness that’s acceptable to
presentists.
1.4 Two kinds of ontological dependence
Adams’s (1986) argument against the existence of thisnesses of future entities is
perfectly consistent with the existence of thisnesses of past entities. The argument
against thisnesses of future entities is based on the fact that the nature of thisnesses
(i.e. particular, primitive, purely non-qualitative properties of some entity) implies a
relationship between thisness and entity. This relationship cannot obtain if the entity
in question is a future entity (for the reasons adduced above). However, this
relationship can obtain if the entity in question is a past entity because past entities
have existed. But this requires saying something substantial about the relationship
between thisness and entity, which is consistent with presentism (‘‘only present
objects exist’’), and this development is no part of Adams’s ontology of thisness.
6 Adams (1986: 319) disagrees: ‘Perhaps an objector will offer me the mirror image of the argument that
I find persuasive against thisnesses of future individuals.… This argument does not persuade me, because
I do not believe that the same things could, logically and metaphysically, have existed now no matter
what had existed earlier. There is a temporal asymmetry in our modal intuitions here. It is very plausible
to say that the existence and identity of anything that exists now cannot depend logically or
metaphysically on anything occurring later, but much less plausible to say that it cannot depend on what
occurred earlier. Indeed, theses making the identity of individuals depend logically or metaphysically on
various facts about their origins or antecedents have great intuitive appeal to many of us. Hence, I have no
strong objection to saying that the thisness of [a past entity] exists now without [the relevant past entity]
existing now, but that if [the past entity] had not existed earlier, that would have been impossible.’ Once
again, I find Adams’s argument persuasive.
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According to Thisness Presentism, x’s thisness, T, depends on x’s having existed;
T couldn’t exist, for instance, if x had never existed. The existence of Socrates’s
thisness (e.g.) implies a relation with Socrates that couldn’t obtain if Socrates had
never existed. Importantly, this isn’t the claim that Socrates’s thisness can’t exist
now if Socrates doesn’t exist now. One way to capture the relation between thisness
and entity is as follows: Socrates’s thisness ontologically depends on Socrates
insofar as Socrates’s thisness couldn’t exist without the initial existence of Socrates.
However, this ontological dependence doesn’t imply that Socrates’s thisness must
cease to exist once Socrates ceases to exist. The initial existence of an entity is
sufficient for the existence of its thisness; the loss of the entity doesn’t necessitate
the loss of the thisness. But, since ontological dependence (standardly construed) is
a relation, and a relation cannot hold unless its relata exist, the relationship of
ontological dependence between an object and its thisness shouldn’t be construed in
the standard way. To resolve this worry, I say that Socrates’s thisness ontologically
depends on Socrates in a ‘non-rigid’ way (i.e. not the standard ‘rigid’ relation of
ontological dependence).
Let’s introduce a ‘rigid’ notion of dependence (i.e. the standard construal of
asymmetric ontological dependence) to serve as a contrast case. Here’s a putative
definition, from Lowe (2010: §1):
x rigidly ontologically depends on y =df (i) necessarily, x exists only if y
exists; and, (ii) it’s not the case that, necessarily, y exists only if x exists.
Consider a standard example, involving an individual, Colbert, and the set whose
only member is Colbert, {Colbert}: {Colbert} rigidly ontologically depends on
Colbert, since {Colbert} exists only if Colbert exists (and it’s not the case that
Colbert exists only if {Colbert} exists).7 This captures the idea that if some object,
x, rigidly depends on another, y, for its existence, then x can’t exist without y. But,
as noted, this isn’t the sense in which a thisness ontologically depends on an entity
(in the temporal, presentist-friendly case).
Diekemper (2015) introduces the idea that x’s thisness, T, ‘non-rigidly’
ontologically depends on x. The ‘non-rigidity’ of the dependence is to be
understood as temporal (rather than modal). The basic idea is as follows. The
existence of T ontologically depends on x’s initial existence, but T doesn’t continue
to depend on x; T merely has depended on x (2015: 65–66). So, T depends on the
initial existence of x (not the continuing existence of it). But T doesn’t always non-
rigidly depend on x; the relationship of dependence doesn’t always hold. It can’t
hold, for instance, when x doesn’t exist. But this is no problem given the proposed
non-rigid ontological dependence. There’s some time at which a thisness
(T) ontologically depends on an entity (x): the initial existence of it (x). With
this in mind, here’s a putative definition of asymmetric temporal non-rigid
ontological dependence:
7 It’s true that if {Colbert} exists then Colbert must exist. But there’s an asymmetric (rigid) dependence
nonetheless. {Colbert} exists in virtue of Colbert, not vice versa. Sets depend on their members (cf. Fine
1994: 4–5).
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x non-rigidly ontologically depends on y =df (i) necessarily, x exists only if y
has existed; and, (ii) it’s not the case that, necessarily, y exists only if x has
existed.
This captures the idea that if x non-rigidly depends on y for its existence, then x
can’t exist without the initial existence of y. This is the sense in which a thisness
(T) ontologically depends on an entity (x). This kind of ontological dependence is
perfectly acceptable to presentists.
In what remains, I will develop Thisness Presentism (and provide additional
details) across a series of replies to the problems facing presentism, mentioned at the
outset. First, I show that my view can resolve a problem about the existence of
singular propositions about the past (Sect. 2), and, in doing so, address a separate
issue about how presentists can account for the ‘asymmetry of fixity’ (cf. Sect. 2.3).
Then, I explain how Thisness Presentism solves a distinct problem about how to
account for temporal passage (Sect. 3).
2 Presentism and propositions
2.1 The problem with singular propositions
Socrates was a wise, snub-nosed philosopher. So, the sentence ‘Socrates was wise’
is true and expresses a (true) proposition,\Socrates was wise[.8 This proposition is
a singular proposition; it’s expressed by a sentence that uses a name (‘Socrates’) and
it’s directly about some entity, Socrates, i.e. the direct referent of the name used in
the sentence. Many philosophers think there are singular propositions.9 Indeed, if
\Socrates was wise[ is true, then the proposition must exist to be true.10 Among
the philosophers who accept the existence of singular propositions, many believe
that propositions are structured entities, with constituents, and that the constituents
of structured singular propositions determine what the proposition is about. So, e.g.,
\Socrates was wise[, might be partly constituted by Socrates himself (or by a
unique property of Socrates, etc.), and this would determine that the proposition is
directly about Socrates.11
8 I follow the convention that ‘\p[’ denotes ‘the proposition that p’.
9 See e.g., Plantinga (1979, 1983), Adams (1981, 1986), Kaplan (1989), Fitch (1994, 1996), Cartwright
(1997), King (2007), and Merricks (2012, 2015), inter alia. All cited agree there are singular propositions,
but disagree about the nature of such propositions. The position to be defended here is closest to Adams’s
view (cf. 1986).
10 Timothy Williamson (2002: 233) puts the point neatly: ‘if the proposition did not exist, there would be
nothing to be true’. The truth of a proposition strictly implies the existence of that proposition. This
presupposes the general view, sometimes called ‘serious actualism’, that an object x has a property P in a
world w only if x exists in w (Plantinga 1979: 145).
11 See e.g., Adams (1981, 1986), Salmon (1986, 2007), Soames (1987), Braun (1993), Fitch (1994,
1996), King (2007, 2014), Speaks (2012), and Fitch and Nelson (2014)), inter alia. All cited agree that
propositions are structured entities and so endorse a broadly ‘neo-Russelian’ view of singular
propositions.
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Presentists face a problem concerning the existence of structured singular
propositions about the past. Structured propositions are partly constituted by other
entities and so depend for their existence upon the existence of their constituents.
But, if past entities don’t exist at all, as presentists insist, then what constitutes
structured propositions about past entities? For instance, what constituent can be
provided for (e.g.)\Socrates was wise[? The obvious constituent is Socrates. But
Socrates doesn’t exist. So, what constitutes singular propositions about the past? Put
another way, how do such propositions about the past exist at all, if the obvious
propositional constituents don’t exist?
There’s a clear solution to this problem available for Thisness Presentism. First,
consider the following putative definition of singular propositions from Adams
(1986: 315): ‘a singular proposition about an individual x is a proposition that
involves or refers to x directly, perhaps by having x or the thisness of x as a
constituent, and not merely by way of x’s qualitative properties or relations to other
individuals’. Here’s the solution, which follows neatly from the definition.12
Structured singular propositions about the past are constituted by thisnesses of past
entities and not constituted by the (non-existent) past entities themselves. So, e.g.,
\Socrates was wise[ is constituted by Socrates’s thisness, being Socrates, and not
Socrates himself. This singular proposition is directly about Socrates in virtue of
having his thisness (a unique property of Socrates) as a constituent. According to
Thisness Presentism, all structured singular propositions about the past are
constituted by presently existing thisnesses;\p[ is a singular proposition about
an entity, x, if\p[ has x’s thisness, T, as a constituent.
In Ned Markosian’s (2004) state of the art defence of presentism, he anticipates
this sort of solution and rejects it. (Markosian argues there are several problems for
this approach and shifts his attention to other strategies.) In what remains of Sect. 2,
I engage with objections adapted from Markosian and defend the account presented
above.13 In the course of my replies, I develop Thisness Presentism in more detail.
2.2 Singular propositions about the future
The first objection is that the solution fails to account for structured singular
propositions about the future. There are no thisnesses of future entities, and so no
thisnesses to constitute propositions about future entities. Markosian argues that this
is an unacceptable implication of the view, since it generates an important
asymmetry between the past and future—there are structured singular propositions
about the past but none about the mere future). And, according to Markosian, ‘any
12 It’s worth noting that Adams’s definition is accepted by Markosian (2004: 49, fn. 4), amongst others,
and Markosian is no friend of the thisness approach to singular propositions presented in what follows.
See also, e.g., Plantinga (1979: 111) and Adams (1981: 3–4) who suggest singular propositions about x
are constituted by x’s ‘individual essence’ rather than x.
13 I assume that singular propositions (about the past and present) exist. So, an ontology that’s unable to
account for them is deficient in one important respect. One option for presentists is to deny there are
singular propositions about the past. But this option strikes me as worse (prima facie) than one that
accounts for them (cf. Markosian 2004: 53–54). That being said, I’m not convinced there are singular
propositions about the future, for reasons I discuss in Sect. 2.2.
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adequate Presentist solution to the problem should treat the past and future as
perfectly analogous’ (Markosian 2004: 55).
However, I see nothing prima facie objectionable about presentists endorsing a
solution involving the kind of temporal asymmetry highlighted. Presumably,
Markosian’s desideratum—that presentists should treat past and future as ‘perfectly
analogous’—is based on the idea that presentists endorse an ‘ontological symmetry’
(i.e. past and future objects are the same, both don’t exist).14 But this doesn’t
establish that presentists cannot countenance any temporal asymmetry (i.e. any
intuitive difference between past and future) whatsoever. For instance, past objects
have existed (have been present), and future objects haven’t yet existed (haven’t
been present). Prima facie, presentists aren’t compelled to reject this asymmetry,
and Markosian gives no reason to think otherwise. At least, there’s no reason to
think this temporal asymmetry is ruled out by presentism’s ontological symmetry.
Furthermore, consider what Diekemper (2005) calls the ‘asymmetry of fixity’: the
future is ‘open’ but the past isn’t.15 Most presentists would likely endorse this
temporal asymmetry. In fact, some motivate presentism by appeal to the idea that
the future is open.16 Once again, it seems there’s nothing that compels presentists to
reject this general and intuitive difference between past and future. Indeed, if one
motivates presentism by the idea that the future is open, then one must surely
embrace this difference.
So, is there independent reason to think endorsing that ‘there are no structured
singular propositions about the (mere) future’ is objectionable? This is a fair question.
Here’s one main reason to accept structured singular propositions about the past. It’s
natural to think\Socrates was wise[ is the meaning expressed by the sentence
‘Socrates was wise’. It’s also reasonable to think the proposition, and not the sentence,
is the fundamental truth-bearer (cf. Merricks 2015: 22–29). And if the proposition
didn’t exist, there would be nothing to be true. This seems a good reason to accept
propositions about past entities, but it doesn’t obviously extend to propositions about
merely future entities. Although we might think\My granddaughter will be tall[ is
the meaning expressed by ‘My granddaughter will be tall’, nothing compels us to
accept that my granddaughter will be tall is true. Since most presentists accept the
future is open, presentists can sensibly remain undecided about whether there are true
singular propositions about merely future entities.17
One might object that this argument proves too little, since presentists must
accept the existence of some true propositions about the future. Certainly, the
14 I borrow the term ‘ontological symmetry’ from Diekemper (2005).
15 David Lewis describes this asymmetry as: ‘the obscure contrast we draw between the ‘‘open future’’
and the ‘‘fixed past’’’. Lewis notes ‘[we] tend to regard the future as a multitude of alternative possibilities
… whereas we regard the past as a unique, settled, immutable actuality’ (Lewis, 1979: 459). For Lewis
and others, this captures a ‘genuine and important’ temporal asymmetry. I discuss this asymmetry and
Diekemper’s (2005) challenge that presentists can’t account for it in Sect. 2.3.
16 For instance, Ross Cameron notes that ‘[a] central motivation for adopting presentism is to secure the
claim that the future is open’ (Cameron 2011: 77). Indeed, it’s also part of the motivation for thinking
there are thisnesses of past entities (but no thisnesses of future entities) as discussed in Sect. 1.
17 See e.g., Bourne (2011).
2876 D. Ingram
123
argument doesn’t carry over to all propositions about the future, including many
singular propositions about the future (e.g.\The sun will rise tomorrow[, etc.).18
But this is perfectly consistent with Thisness Presentism, which has the resources to
deal with all (true) structured singular propositions involving past and present
entities, some of which may be directed towards the future. My concern here is with
(true) structured singular propositions about merely future entities, i.e. things that
haven’t yet existed (haven’t been present), since that’s the focus of Markosian’s first
objection. I say there are no such propositions, nor could there be (cf. Sect. 1.3;
Adams 1986)—but I don’t say there are no propositions (singular or non-singular)
about the future at all.
Even so, one might press the objection and insist that there are some (true)
singular propositions about merely future entities.19 For instance, suppose that I plan
to carve a statue from a lump of clay and that I name my future creation ‘Goliath’. It
seems I can believe and assert things about Goliath, e.g. ‘Goliath will be ten-feet
tall’, even though I haven’t yet carved the statue (and Goliath doesn’t exist). So,
there are (true) singular propositions about a merely future entity, e.g.\Goliath will
be ten-feet tall[, expressed by sentences that use the name ‘Goliath’. (Or so the
objection goes.) And, hence, Thisness Presentism is in trouble, since it cannot
account for such propositions: there are no thisnesses of merely future entities, and
so no singular propositions about such entities.
I think this objection fails for familiar reasons (i.e. those articulated in Sect. 1.3).
Although it seems I can believe and assert things about Goliath (prior to carving the
statue), there are no (true) singular propositions about Goliath prior to Goliath’s
existence. Following Adams (1986), there are no singular propositions about entities
that never exist, so there cannot be singular propositions about entities that haven’t
yet existed. Paraphrasing Adams, ‘‘Goliath’s thisness, and singular propositions
about Goliath, cannot have pre-existed Goliath because if they had it would have
been possible for them to have existed even if Goliath had never existed, and that is
not possible’’ (1986: 317). There are numerous (metaphysically possible) obstacles
to Goliath’s creation, prior to its carving, so there cannot be singular propositions
about Goliath until Goliath exists (has existed).
This might seem counterintuitive. To reiterate, it seems I can believe and assert
things about Goliath, prior to its existence. E.g., I believe I will make Goliath, I
believe Goliath will be ten-feet tall, and so on. Aren’t these all things I can believe?
And aren’t the contents of such beliefs singular propositions that involve Goliath as
a constituent? Not so. I deny that such propositions have singular content—there are
no singular propositions about the merely future entity, Goliath. Indeed, I’m far
from convinced that it’s really so counterintuitive to hold the position that I do. To
resist the challenge that this proposal is counterintuitive, let me raise two points.
18 It’s plausible that presentists who accept the future is ‘open’ will concede that it isn’t ‘open’ with
respect to every proposition about the future. But this is consistent with my account. There are no singular
propositions about merely future entities, and so no singular propositions about entities that might fail to
exist (Adams 1986), but there may well be other truth-apt propositions about the future. For more on
presentism and the open future, see Sect. 2.3.
19 I’m grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this concern.
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First, though without endorsing a causal theory of reference, it’s worth noting
that, at any moment prior to Goliath’s existence, I will have had no causal
interaction with Goliath. I won’t have seen the statue. I won’t have touched it. There
are no causal chains leading from Goliath to me, such that Goliath itself can have
impacted upon the way that I think about it. That being the case, it doesn’t seem
unreasonable to say that I might fail to entertain singular propositions that involve
Goliath as a constituent.
Second, and to return to some of the original concerns: at any moment prior to
carving the statue of Goliath, it remains possible that Goliath not be created.
Certainly, I may form the intention to create something, but perhaps an accident will
befall me on my way home tonight, such that I never sculpt again. If Goliath may
never come to exist, then (we may say) the world is not yet settled as to whether or
not Goliath will come to exist. There is no settled fact of the matter as to what that
singular thing is. In that case, again, it doesn’t seem so very counterintuitive to say
that there might fail to be singular propositions about Goliath.
According to Thisness Presentism, there’s at least one temporal asymmetry: there
are structured singular propositions about the past, but not about the mere future. But
this is no problem for the view. In fact, the above considerations can be used as part of a
novel solution to a related problem facing presentism, concerning the ‘asymmetry of
fixity’ (cf. Diekemper 2005). I address this problem in Sect. 2.3 and then return to the
defence of the thisness approach to propositions in Sects. 2.4 and 2.5.
2.3 Presentism and the ‘asymmetry of fixity’
Joseph Diekemper (2005) argues that one can only account for the ‘asymmetry of
fixity’ (i.e. the ‘open’ future and the ‘closed’ past) via an ontological asymmetry.
That is, the future is ‘open’ because future entities don’t exist, whereas the past is
‘closed’ because past entities do exist. Diekemper raises this as a problem for
presentism, ‘‘only present things exist,’’ since presentists appear to accept an
ontological symmetry: past and future objects don’t exist.
Let’s concede with Diekemper that some ontological difference between the past
and future is required in order to account for the asymmetry of fixity. Even granting
this concession, it’s not clear that the only ontological difference sufficient is one
that involves the existence of past objects. Further, there’s reason to doubt
Diekemper’s implicit premise that presentism is unable to endorse any ontological
difference between the past and the future whatsoever.
Thisness Presentism proposes that there’s an ontological difference between the
past and the future. That is, there are presently existing thisnesses of past entities,
but no thisnesses of future entities. More precisely, although Thisness Presentism
maintains that past and future objects don’t exist, as a version of presentism,
Thisness Presentism proposes that there are presently existing surrogates (or
‘proxies’) of past entities, but no such surrogates for future entities. This is a kind of
ontological difference between past and future, although the presentist’s ontological
scruples are maintained: only present entities exist.
So, how do we account for the asymmetry of fixity? According to Thisness
Presentism, the past is ‘closed’ in virtue of there being thisnesses of past entities,
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and the future is ‘open’ in virtue of there being no thisnesses of future entities. As
noted, the fact that there are thisnesses of past entities implies that the existence of
past entities isn’t contingent, given the way things are presently, and the fact that
there are no thisnesses of future entities implies that the existence of future entities
is contingent. This is sufficient for presentists to account for the asymmetry of fixity.
Contrary to Diekemper’s (2005) argument, presentists can account for the
asymmetry of fixity without endorsing a problematic ontological asymmetry. But
presentists must endorse Thisness Presentism (and the underlying ontology of
thisness) in order to account for this apparent feature of reality. This is one further
motivation for adopting Thisness Presentism.
2.4 Thisnesses and presentism
The second objection is important. According to Markosian, accepting thisnesses
violates presentism, since thisnesses of past entities cannot exist without past
entities. That is, Markosian insists that accepting the existence of thisnesses of past
entities requires an ontological commitment to past entities. The rationale is
straightforward: if Socrates’s thisness is the property being (identical with)
Socrates, then Socrates must exist in order to constitute that property. And, if
Socrates partly constitutes being Socrates, the property can’t continue to exist once
Socrates has ceased to exist (Markosian 2004: 55–56).
The crucial claim here is that Socrates’s thisness cannot exist without Socrates
because Socrates partly constitutes the property. The quick reply to Markosian is
that thisnesses aren’t constituted by entities, so accepting Socrates’s thisness doesn’t
imply the existence of Socrates. But Markosian anticipates this sort of reply and
responds as follows:
I have a hard time understanding how Socrates could fail to be a constituent of
Socraticity [i.e. Socrates’s thisness], although, admittedly, what we say about
this matter depends partly on what we say about the tricky subject of the
nature of constituency. In any case … it seems clear to me that this principle
will be true: The property of being identical with x exists only if x itself exists.
For it seems to me that, for any relation and for any object, the property of
standing in that relation to that object will exist only if the object exists. (2004:
56, fn. 15)
Markosian argues that a relation holds (and, indeed, must hold) between Socrates
and his thisness. According to Markosian, the property being Socrates exists only if
Socrates exists, since ‘for any relation and for any object, the property of standing in
that relation to that object will exist only if the object exists’.20 A complete reply
must deal with this challenge.
So, let me offer the complete reply and, in doing so, reiterate certain important
aspects of my account of the nature of thisnesses. According to Thisness Presentism,
20 This assumes something like ‘serious actualism’ (see my fn. 10, in Sect. 2.1, above). I concede the
plausibly of this principle and don’t challenge it in my reply to Markosian.
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thisnesses can exist (uninstantiated) without the continued existence of the relevant
entities. And, importantly, no existence-entailing relation obtains between presently
existing thisnesses of past entities and the (non-existent) past entities themselves.
That is, Socrates’s thisness cannot exist at all without the initial existence of
Socrates, but the continued existence of his thisness doesn’t require that Socrates
continues to exist. (Socrates’s thisness depends for its existence on the initial
existence of Socrates and not his continued existence.) More precisely, Socrates’s
thisness ‘non-rigidly’ ontologically depends on Socrates. So, the existence of
Socrates’s thisness depends on Socrates coming into being, but doesn’t continue to
depend on his existence; Socrates’s thisness merely has depended on Socrates for its
existence (and depends no longer).
2.5 Singular propositions and thisnesses
The third objection, adapted from Markosian, is that a thisness approach fails to
provide genuine singular propositions about the past by invoking thisnesses of past
entities (and not the past entities themselves) as propositional constituents
(Markosian 2004: 56). Markosian urges that ‘it is not at all clear that the
proposition that there was a unique x that exemplified Socraticity and that was a
philosopher is really a singular proposition about Socrates’ (2004: 56).
At first pass, Markosian seems to object that \There was a unique x that
exemplified Socrates’s thisness and was a philosopher[ isn’t a singular proposition
about Socrates. This is correct. That proposition is about Socrates’s thisness instead.
But, as it stands, this isn’t an objection to my thisness solution. According to
Thisness Presentism, \Socrates was a philosopher[ is a structured entity,
constituted by Socrates’s thisness, and it’s directly about Socrates (and so singular)
in virtue of having his thisness as a constituent (Adams 1986: 315). Thisness
Presentism doesn’t replace \Socrates was a philosopher[ with a distinct
proposition,\There was a unique x that exemplified Socrates’s thisness and was
a philosopher[, as Markosian seems to suggest.
Perhaps a more charitable reading of Markosian’s objection is that\Socrates was
a philosopher[ isn’t really about Socrates if it’s constituted by a thisness (and not
Socrates). There’s a simple (yet flatfooted) reply to this objection. Recall,
Markosian’s preferred definition of a singular proposition about an entity, x, is ‘a
proposition that involves or refers to x directly, perhaps by having x or the thisness
of x as a constituent’ (2004: 49, fn. 4). The view of propositions provided by
Thisness Presentism is perfectly consistent with this definition.\Socrates was a
philosopher[ is a singular proposition about Socrates, which involves Socrates by
having his thisness as a constituent. In slogan form: ‘‘\Socrates was a philosopher[
is about Socrates because it has Socrates’s thisness as a constituent.’’ It’s a feature
of Thisness Presentism that it provides us with an analysis of when a singular
proposition is about an entity. A singular proposition,\p[ is about an entity, x, if
\p[has x’s thisness, T, as a constituent. The analysis might be slightly surprising
to the likes of Markosian, but Markosian’s surprise need not constitute a fatal
objection to the current proposal.
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In reply, Markosian might insist that if\Socrates was a philosopher[is constituted
by Socrates’s thisness then it’s not really about Socrates. Indeed, to further develop the
objection, Markosian (2004: 56) contrasts two propositions: \Socrates was a
philosopher[and\Plato’s best teacher was a philosopher[. Both are about Socrates
but, importantly, the latter proposition is only indirectly about him (and so isn’t a
singular proposition about Socrates).21 Plausibly, \Plato’s best teacher was a
philosopher[isn’t directly about Socrates (and so isn’t singular) because it’s constituted
by the property being Plato’s best teacher. Here’s the more developed objection.
According to Markosian, if we accept\Plato’s best teacher was a philosopher[isn’t a
singular proposition about Socrates, as we should, then we must also accept that
\Socrates was a philosopher[(when constituted bySocrates’s thisness) isn’t a singular
proposition about Socrates. Markosian reasons that the properties functioning as
propositional constituents, e.g.beingPlato’s best teacher andbeingSocrates, are similar
in kind. Hence, propositions constituted by them aren’t genuine singular propositions.
To put the challenge plainly, Markosian asks the following question: ‘what is the
difference between Socraticity and the property of being Plato’s best teacher in virtue of
which a proposition containing the former property is a singular proposition about
Socrates while a proposition containing the latter property is not?’ (2004: 56).
Suppose we resist the temptation to merely restate the analysis (e.g. ‘‘a singular
proposition,\p[is about an entity, x, if\p[has x’s thisness, T, as a constituent’’).What
else can be said in reply? Here’s one thought: Markosian is wrong, the two properties
aren’t similar in kind, and there’s a difference in virtue ofwhich a proposition containing
being Socrates is a singular proposition about Socrates. The difference between the
properties is that being Socrates is essential to Socrates whereas being Plato’s best
teacher is only accidental to him. In fact, being Socrates is an ‘individual essence’ of
Socrates.22 That Socrates happened to be Plato’s best teacher is contingent, whereas
Socrates beingSocrates is absolutely essential.The fact\Socrateswas a philosopher[is
constituted by Socrates’s thisness allows us to say that\Socrates was a philosopher[is
directly about Socrates (and so singular). The fact \Plato’s best teacher was a
philosopher[ is constituted by an accidental property of Socrates allows us to say that
\Plato’s best teacher was a philosopher[is only indirectly about Socrates (and so not
singular). So, regardless of Markosian’s resistance to the analysis, there’s good
independent reason to think a proposition constituted by x’s thisness is a singular
proposition about x (whereas a proposition constituted by another property of x isn’t a
singular proposition about x).23
21 There’s a link between propositions being ‘directly about’ entities and being singular propositions.
Paraphrasing Alvin Plantinga, ‘‘\Socrates was a philosopher[involves Socrates in amore direct and intimate
way than does\Plato’s best teacher was a philosopher[. In fact,\Plato’s best teacher was a philosopher[is
about Socrates accidentally (or ‘indirectly’), in virtue of the fact Socrates happened to be Plato’s best teacher;
\Socrates was a philosopher[is directly (and not accidentally) about Socrates’’ (Plantinga 1983: 3).
22 Socrates’s thisness is an individual essence because it’s an essential property that’s only ever
instantiated by Socrates.
23 Markosian (2004: 56) offers a fourth and final objection that I don’t consider in any detail here. The
objection is an apparent dilemma arising from two previous objections (Sects. 2.4, 2.5). According to
Markosian, either singular propositions about the past aren’t genuine, and the problem facing presentism
remains unresolved; or, the singular propositions about the past are genuine, but this implies an
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One might object that it’s simply unclear how a proposition can be about something
that doesn’t exist. How can\Socrates was a philosopher[ be about Socrates, either
directly or indirectly, when Socrates doesn’t exist at all?24 To reply, I think that this
potential unclarity emerges frommaking one key (false) assumption about the nature of
‘aboutness’. Specifically, one assumes that ‘aboutness’ is a relation that links entities,
e.g. a proposition (\Socrates was a philosopher[) and an individual (Socrates). To be
clear, I think there’s no relation of ‘aboutness’ at work here. (At least, there’s no
metaphysically heavyweight relation that entails the existence of both relata, i.e.
proposition and individual.) In this respect, I align with Trenton Merricks (2007) who
makes the point quite neatly as follows: ‘I do not deny, however, that in a different and
more familiar sense of ‘about’, that Queen Anne has been dead some years is ‘about
something’—obviously, it is ‘about Queen Anne’. But this no more implies that Queen
Anne exists than a ghost story’s being ‘about ghosts’ implies that ghosts exist’ (2007:
137, fn. 17). I think that\Socrates was a philosopher[is ‘about Socrates’ in a way that
doesn’t demand the existence of Socrates, and this is underpinned by the fact that the
proposition is partly constituted by Socrates’s thisness. Indeed, it’s this notion of
aboutness that’s at issue in the above analysis: a singular proposition,\p[is about an
entity, x, if\p[has x’s thisness, T, as a constituent.
2.6 Summary
A thisness solution to the problem facing presentism concerning the existence of
structured singular propositions about the past is plausible and successful. An
account of singular propositions, given in terms of presently existing thisnesses of
past entities, is prima facie acceptable to presentists. Further, Markosian (2004), a
leading opponent of a thisness approach, provides no definitive objections to
undermine the solution outlined. Presentists should opt for an approach to singular
propositions involving thisnesses and accept Thisness Presentism.
3 Presentism and the ‘myth of passage’
Lisa Leininger (2015) argues presentists can’t account for temporal passage because
of an incompatibility between two claims: (i) only the present exists, and (ii) what’s
present changes. In particular, Leininger argues presentists aren’t justified in
positing presently existing surrogates of past entities to resolve the incompatibility,
Footnote 23 continued
objectionable connection between thisnesses and the past. However, since I’ve shown the previous
objections fail, so the dilemma can be dissolved quickly. (The first horn: ‘‘\Socrates was wise[ isn’t
directly about Socrates, if it’s constituted by Socrates’s thisness.’’ The second horn: ‘‘the only way for
Socrates’s thisness to generate ‘direct aboutness’ between singular proposition and Socrates is by having
Socrates as a constituent.’’) According to Thisness Presentism,\Socrates was wise[ is directly about
Socrates if\Socrates was wise[has Socrates’s thisness as a constituent. And this, in turn, doesn’t imply
that Socrates exists to constitute Socrates’s thisness. Thisnesses are unstructured entities and Socrates’s
thisness non-rigidly ontologically depends on the initial existence of Socrates.
24 I’m grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.
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i.e. using present resources to account for the fact that what’s present changes. In
this section, I introduce the problem in a little more detail (Sect. 3.1) and rehearse
Leininger’s challenge against positing presently existing surrogates of past entities
(Sect. 3.2). I reply and present Thisness Presentism as a version of presentism that
involves surrogates but resists Leininger’s challenge (Sect. 3.3).
3.1 The problem of passage
Can a presentist, who believes ‘‘only present things exist,’’ account for temporal
passage? According to Leininger (2015), presentists cannot, since two central elements
of presentism are incompatible. These two elements are: ‘‘only the present exists: past
and future moments don’t exist’’ (Present Thesis), and ‘‘what’s present changes: there’s
a difference in what exists from moment to moment’’ (Change Thesis).
Leininger’s (2015) argument has three steps. First, the passage of time—that
what’s future approaches the present, becoming less future, and that what’s past
recedes, becoming more past—requires temporal change. Second, temporal change,
i.e. that what’s present changes (from moment to moment), requires a difference in
the character of each successive present moment. And, third, establishing a
difference between two (successive) moments requires that both moments exist
(2015: 730). This generates the advertised incompatibility between the Present
Thesis and the Change Thesis: temporal change requires the existence of more than
one moment, but only one moment (the present moment) exists.
Leininger anticipates (and rejects) one line of response on behalf of the presentist.
That is: ‘…to appeal to presently existing surrogates to accommodate the former
privileged nature of a past moment, and thereby to establish the succession of creation
and annihilation needed for temporal change in the presentist picture’ (2015: 731).
The basic idea is as follows. Presentists can postulate presently existing resources to
serve as proxies for past moments in order to account for temporal change. Presentists
can thus compare the present moment with a proxy past moment in order to establish
that what’s present has changed (2015: 731–732). But Leininger argues that
presentists aren’t justified in appealing to presently existing surrogates in this way.
According to Leininger, an account of the reality of temporal change must preclude
the possibility of a ‘one-instant world’ (i.e. a world with no events preceding or
succeeding the present instant), but an appeal to present surrogates doesn’t rule out the
possibility of the one-instant world. Presentists can’t account for temporal change by
positing surrogates if positing surrogates doesn’t rule out this possibility (2015: 732).
In what follows, I sketch Leininger’s challenge that the presentist’s account of
temporal change doesn’t rule out the possibility of a one-instant world in a little
more detail (Sect. 3.2). Then, I present Thisness Presentism and show how this view
can account for temporal change in a way that rules out the possibility of a one-
instant world (and thus resolves Leininger’s problem facing presentism) (Sect. 3.3).
3.2 Against surrogates
Consider a one-instant world OIW, which is different from the actual world @ since
there are no past or future events at OIW. There’s no temporal change at OIW, but
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there’s change at @. To account for temporal change, presentists must develop a
view that precludes the possibility of the one-instant world. As Leininger writes:
‘that in virtue of which there is temporal change must preclude the possibility of a
one-instant world’ (2015: 732). If presentists use presently existing surrogates (of
past things) in order to account for temporal change, it must be in virtue of the
existence of such surrogates that OIW is shown to be impossible. This is the
criterion of success for the presentist’s account of temporal change.
Leininger proposes the ‘One Instant Test’ to evaluate whether an account of
temporal change precludes the possibility of the one-instant world, OIW. The test
(or ‘OIT’) is framed as a question:
Suppose that God creates only this one instant, exactly as it is NOW. Is he able
to create—in this one instant—the relevant ingredients by which the presentist
establishes temporal change? (2015: 732)
To pass the test, the answer to the OIT must be ‘No’. The presentist’s account of
temporal change must guarantee that the world persists; if the world persists then
it’s not a one-instant world, and the reality of temporal change requires this fact
(2015: 732–733). Put another way, if God can create one (temporally isolated)
instant of the world, which includes all the materials used by presentists to account
for temporal change, then such presently existing materials lack an appropriate
connection to the past moments (and things, more generally) for which they are
supposed proxies. This isn’t enough to establish that what’s present really changes.
Failing the OIT implies failing to account for temporal change.
Leininger’s argument (against surrogates) is elegant and compelling. Presentists
can’t account for genuine temporal change by positing presently existing surrogates
(of past things) because the existence of such surrogates doesn’t guarantee that the
world persists (i.e. the appeal to surrogates is compatible with the possibility of the
one-instant world). Leininger considers three main presentist accounts of surrogates
and shows how each fails theOIT. To illustrate, I rehearse Leininger’s case against one
such presentist account, due to John Bigelow (1996), in what remains of Sect. 3.2.
Bigelow (1996) proposes that all truths about the past, i.e. truths about what was
the case, are made true by the world presently instantiating primitive tensed
properties.25 For example, \Caesar existed[ is made true by the world now
instantiating having contained Caesar. The proposed ‘truth-makers’ in this case are
tensed facts (or states of affairs): presently existing facts about how the world was.
Leaving aside the issue of truth-makers, the question here is: can the existence of
tensed facts establish that another moment exists and so preclude the possibility of
the one-instant world? Put another way, can this view account for temporal change?
Leininger thinks not.
According to Leininger’s view fails the OIT (2015: 733). Can God create only
this one instant, exactly as it is now, and in that instant also create all of the relevant
tensed facts? Leininger suggests that the presentist must say ‘Yes’ (and fail the
25 See also, e.g., Chisholm (1990a, b), Keller (2004: 94–96), Crisp (2007), and McDaniel (2014), inter
alia. Bigelow cites Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura as the origin of this sort of view (and introduces the
label ‘Lucretianism’).
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OIT). Bigelow’s presentist cannot, for instance, stipulate that tensed facts—present
instantiations of primitive past-tensed properties—are caused by past events
themselves, and so couldn’t exist at a one-instant world. Why not? Well, as
Leininger (2015: 733) writes: ‘If the events in the past caused the past-tensed
properties to exist in the present, then this causal relation necessitates the existence
of the relata—both the past-tensed properties and the existence of the past’. This
would be a bad result for presentism. Further, according to Leininger, Bigelow’s
presentist can’t maintain the causal story, without the troublesome existence-
entailing necessitation, because ‘there needs to be some kind of connection between
the formerly existing past and past-tensed properties to pass the OIT’ (2015: 733). In
sum, Bigelow’s tensed properties (and facts) cannot be used as surrogates to account
for temporal change because such properties (and facts) are independent of the
existence of the past.
I concede that Bigelow’s presentist (as presented above) can’t account for
temporal change. And I’m also sympathetic to further remarks against the other
presentist accounts of surrogates. But Leininger doesn’t establish definitively that
there’s nothing a presentist can say about their proposed surrogates of past entities
to avoid the worry. In fact, I think Thisness Presentism can solve the problem. (As it
happens, Leininger (2015: 733, fn. 15) anticipates and rejects something like
Thisness Presentism as a solution. But the rejection is too hasty.) Next, in Sect. 3.3,
I explain how Thisness Presentism solves the problem and reply directly to
Leininger.
3.3 Thisness Presentism and passage
Let’s begin with a quick recap. According to Thisness Presentism, x’s thisness
(being x) comes into being with x, is uniquely instantiated by x throughout x’s
existence, and continues to exist uninstantiated when x has ceased to exist. Hence,
there are thisnesses of present entities, e.g. Colbert’s thisness (being Colbert), and
uninstantiated thisnesses of past entities, e.g. Caesar’s thisness (being Caesar).
To paraphrase Leininger, ‘‘thisnesses of past entities (i.e. moments) are apt to
play the role of presently existing surrogates, used to accommodate the former
privileged nature of a past moment, thereby establishing the succession of creation
and annihilation needed for temporal change in the presentist picture. That is,
thisnesses can serve as proxies for past moments in order to account for temporal
change; the present moment can be compared with the uninstantiated thisness of a
past moment in order to establish that what’s present has changed’’ (2015:
731–732). But does this view pass the OIT? That is, can God create only this one
instant, exactly as it is now, and in that instant also create all of the relevant
uninstantiated thisnesses of past entities? (Leininger thinks so, but I disagree.)
Leininger briefly argues that this sort of view can’t account for temporal change
for the same sort of reasons that undermine Bigelow’s presentist (as above):
[Thisness Presentism] … encounters a difficulty similar to the difficulty that
Bigelow’s account faces. Specifically, these haecceities get created by the
same events that bring about the existence of their individuals. Thus, there
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needs to be a causal connection between past events and the presently existing
haecceities. (2015: 733, fn. 15)
Leininger is correct that there must be a connection (at some time) between a
thisness (T) and object (x), since x comes into being with T and T couldn’t exist
without the initial existence of x. Indeed, this is why the existence of T can be used
to determine that x did exist. But Leininger’s claim that ‘there needs to be a causal
connection’ between x and T is false. The connection between object x and its
thisness T isn’t the troublesome existence-entailing relation of causal necessitation.
And the relevant connection between x and T doesn’t have to persist beyond the
initial existence of x. As such, Leininger is wrong to dismiss this sort of view so
quickly. (More cautiously: so long as the nature of thisnesses, and the connection
between object and thisness, can be adequately developed, Leininger’s argument
hasn’t definitively undermined Thisness Presentism.)
Thisness Presentism passes the OIT: God cannot create only this instant, exactly
as it is now, and also create all uninstantiated thisnesses of past entities. Consider
the thisness of an individual (rather than a moment, for simplicity), e.g. Caesar’s
thisness, the property being Caesar. Caesar’s thisness exists now, without Caesar,
but couldn’t exist before Caesar existed. According to Thisness Presentism,
Caesar’s thisness ‘non-rigidly’ ontologically depends on Caesar26; Caesar’s thisness
couldn’t exist without the initial existence of Caesar. However, this dependence
doesn’t imply that Caesar’s thisness ceases to exist once Caesar ceases to exist. The
initial existence of Caesar is sufficient for the existence of Caesar’s thisness; the loss
of Caesar doesn’t necessitate the loss of Caesar’s thisness.
So, recall Leininger’s ‘One Instant Test’ (OIT) to evaluate whether an account of
temporal change precludes the possibility of the one-instant world. Can God create
only this one instant, exactly as it is now, and in that instant also create all of the
relevant uninstantiated thisnesses of past entities? To pass the test, the answer to this
question must be ‘No’. According to Thisness Presentism, the answer is ‘No’. God
cannot create uninstantiated thisnesses of past entities at a one-instant world.
Necessarily, for any x, x’s thisness T exists only if x has existed; the fact that the
connection between x and T doesn’t always obtain, doesn’t undermine the fact that
T cannot exist without the initial existence of x. (Quite generally, given the account
of the nature of thisnesses put forward in Sect. 1, there cannot be any thisnesses of
entities that haven’t yet existed.)
The Thisness Presentist’s account of temporal change thus precludes the
possibility of a one-instant world. If there are uninstantiated thisnesses of past
entities, then there must have been past entities. This undermines Leininger’s (2015)
argument that presentists aren’t justified in appealing to presently existing
surrogates (in order to establish some difference between successive moments).
Thus, presentists have a way to resolve the incompatibility between the Present
26 Recall the definition of (asymmetric, temporal) non-rigid ontological dependence (from Sect. 1.4): x
non-rigidly ontologically depends on y =df; (1) necessarily, x exists only if y has existed; and, (2) it’s not
the case that, necessarily, y exists only if x has existed. This is the sense in which x’s thisness, T,
ontologically depends on x.
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Thesis (‘only the present exists’) and the Change Thesis (‘what’s present changes’):
the present moment can be compared to a proxy past moment, i.e. an uninstantiated
thisness of a past moment, in order to establish that what’s present has changed.
This provides a further reason for presentists to endorse Thisness Presentism.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I’ve presented my preferred version of presentism (‘Thisness
Presentism’) and shown how it can be used to solve at least three problems facing
standard iterations of presentism. Since it solves these problems, Thisness
Presentism is preferable to other versions of presentism. This is a good positive
reason in favour of it and the underlying thisness ontology.
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